When Did the Space Shuttle First Fly? The Story of STS-1

The Space Shuttle, a reusable spacecraft that promised to revolutionize space travel, embarked on its maiden voyage on April 12, 1981. This mission, designated STS-1, marked the beginning of a new era for human spaceflight, ending a noticeable gap in American space exploration since the Apollo and Apollo-Soyuz missions. NASA envisioned the Space Shuttle as more than just a vehicle; it was intended to be a cornerstone of a comprehensive space transportation system. This system would encompass everything from the spacecraft themselves and ground facilities to communication networks, trained personnel, established logistical frameworks, and a schedule for a multitude of space-based tasks. The Shuttle was designed to be a crucial element in a larger plan that included a Space Station, unmanned missions to other planets, and even crewed voyages to Mars.

The groundbreaking STS-1 mission was lauded as the pinnacle of aviation achievement in 1981, earning the prestigious Collier Trophy. This accolade recognized the collective efforts of NASA, Rockwell International, Martin Marietta, Thiokol, and the vast government-industry partnership behind the Space Shuttle’s design, construction, and flight. The award also honored the STS-1 crew: John Young and Robert Crippen. NASA had a strong history with the Collier Trophy, with ten wins in the twenty years leading up to 1981 for projects like Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, Landsat, and Skylab. The Space Shuttle, however, was a distinctly different achievement. It was a true aerospace vehicle, capable of launching like a rocket, operating in the vacuum of space, and returning to Earth for a runway landing, ready for another mission. N. Wayne Hale, a Shuttle missions flight director, drew an analogy to a battleship, emphasizing that while the crew might be relatively small, a vast support network of thousands, linked by Mission Control, was essential for its operation. Owen Morris, a leading figure in the Shuttle Program Office, highlighted the Shuttle’s intricate nature, calling it an immense and incredibly complex engineering undertaking.

Drawing of early shuttle concepts including: capsule, lifting body, winged first-stage with winged or rocket second-stage, and winged with external-tank designs.

While STS-1 took flight in 1981, the Space Shuttle program’s origins stretch back much further, even predating the Apollo lunar missions. As the prospect of human spaceflight gained momentum in the late 1950s, scientists and engineers envisioned a step-by-step approach. This roadmap began with launching a human into space within a capsule (Project Mercury), followed by giving astronauts control over their spacecraft (Project Gemini). The third step was the development of a reusable space vehicle for Earth orbit and return. This reusable vehicle was then intended to be used to construct and service a permanent Space Station in low Earth orbit. Finally, the Space Station would serve as a launch platform for planetary and lunar missions using more economical, reusable space vehicles. This concept of a reusable space vehicle, which ultimately became the Space Shuttle, as being intrinsically linked to a space station, persisted throughout much of the Shuttle’s development.

A key factor in spaceflight economics is that escaping Earth’s gravity requires only about 1.41 times the velocity needed to achieve Earth orbit. The high costs of space missions were largely due to the expendable nature of rockets and fuel tanks, and the limited reusability of spacecraft. Space exploration was quickly becoming an expensive endeavor. The Space Shuttle program, more so than previous space projects, was heavily influenced by cost considerations, both in its initial justification and its design. However, the national priority to land an American on the Moon within the 1960s, as declared by President Kennedy, led to NASA’s Apollo program taking precedence, overshadowing both the Space Station and the Space Shuttle concepts. Consequently, when the Space Shuttle eventually materialized without a Space Station to service, it appeared to some as detached from its original purpose – an aerospace plane seemingly without a clear space mission.

Tracing the Origins: When Did the Space Shuttle Program Truly Begin?

Pinpointing the exact starting point of the Space Shuttle program is complex. One could argue it began in March 1966, when a NASA team drafted a statement of work for a “Reusable Ground Launch Vehicle Concept and Development Planning Study.” Another potential starting point is October 27, 1966, during an Apollo applications conference in Houston, where leaders from the Marshall Space Flight Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center agreed to independently study shuttle systems based on the March 1966 document. A more definitive milestone is January 23, 1969, when George E. Mueller, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, authorized contract negotiations for preliminary Shuttle design work. However, the roots of the Space Shuttle concept can be traced back even earlier.

In 1958, under House Resolution 496, the House Committee on Science and Astronautics held hearings to guide the creation of a new federal agency for America’s space program. During these hearings, numerous experts emphasized space stations and “controlled space flight” as essential precursors to lunar and deep-space expeditions. Brigadier General A. H. Boushey, Air Force Director of Advanced Technology, identified piloted spacecraft as the “most important” goal for true space exploration, distinguishing them from simple “man-in-space” proposals where humans were merely passengers.

Boushey envisioned “space tugs” assembling a large Space Station by the end of the 1960s, operating exclusively outside the atmosphere. He also anticipated “manned resupply and maintenance spacecraft” shuttling between Earth and orbiting satellites. Furthermore, he predicted a piloted spacecraft refueling at the Space Station in Earth orbit before landing on the Moon.

T. F. Morrow, vice president of Chrysler Corporation, suggested that while space stations might come later, “space trips encircling the Earth and the Moon” were likely by 1969. Rocket expert Dr. Walter R. Dornberger foresaw “manned and automatic space astronomical observatories; manned space laboratories; manned and automatic filling, storage, supply and assembly space facilities; manned space maintenance and supply and rescue ships,” culminating in the first crewed lunar flight.

Roy K. Knutson, Chairman of the Corporate Space Committee for North American Aviation, provided a precise definition of a “winged” space vehicle. While capsules like Mercury served to gather physiological data, he argued that “Ultimately … consideration must be given to the problem of reentering the Earth’s atmosphere from orbit in a winged vehicle capable of landing at a designated spot under control of a pilot.” He viewed North American Aviation’s X-15 as a precursor to such a craft and considered solving the reentry challenge as the most crucial engineering hurdle. In 1958, Knutson offered a remarkably prescient description of what would become the Space Shuttle:

A large rocket booster would be used to boost the vehicle to high altitudes. Then a rocket engine installed in the ship itself would be ignited to provide further acceleration to the 25, 000 miles per hour required for orbiting. In a low trajectory, the vehicle would pass halfway around the Earth in 45 minutes. A retrorocket would start the ship out of orbit at perhaps 10, 000 miles from the landing point. As the vehicle enters the denser atmosphere, the nose and edges of the wing and tail will glow like iron in a blacksmith’s forge. The structure will be built to withstand this extreme condition, however, and the pilot glide down to a dead stick landing.

Even before the Soviet Sputnik launch, scientists and engineers were seriously contemplating spacecraft construction. Krafft A. Eriche, for instance, presented calculations on a manned nuclear-propelled space vehicle in 1957. In January of the same year, NACA engineers at Ames Aeronautical Laboratory secretly reported on their “Preliminary Investigation of a New Research Airplane for Exploring the Problems of Efficient Hypersonic Flight,” aiming for speeds of Mach 10 and altitudes of 140,000 feet – significantly exceeding the X-15’s capabilities.

With Congressional guidance and the expertise of NACA and the American (and Canadian) aircraft industry, NASA was established in 1958 with the mandate to lead the United States in space exploration, science, and technology. However, early American space achievements felt hard-won and slow to materialize.

The Soviet Union’s launch of the first satellite in 1957 was followed by further Soviet space successes in 1959, including Luna II impacting the Moon and Luna III photographing the Moon’s far side. On April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin became the first human in space. By 1961, fueled by the Democratic presidential campaign, Americans were grappling with the perceived “missile gap.” Following the elections, President John F. Kennedy and Congress set a new course for NASA on May 25, 1961, prioritizing a lunar landing before the end of the decade, effectively overshadowing existing programs.

The Apollo program became the dominant focus. While a Space Station and Earth-to-orbit spacecraft could contribute to a sustained space presence and serve as platforms for further lunar and planetary exploration, they weren’t directly aligned with the immediate goal of a lunar landing within the decade. NASA re-adjusted its priorities to accommodate Apollo. The Space Station and reusable aerospace craft remained as future possibilities. Marshall Space Flight Center, however, continued to investigate the reusable vehicle concept. As early as 1963, Marshall developed a statement of work for a fully reusable, rocket-powered vehicle capable of carrying civilian passengers and substantial payloads, awarding design study contracts to Lockheed Aircraft and North American Aviation. Despite these studies, NASA’s primary focus remained on Mercury, Gemini, and Apollo. The Mercury program concluded by the end of 1963, and the final Gemini mission flew in 1966. The first crewed Apollo flight was scheduled for 1965, and an uncrewed test flight of the Apollo-Saturn system, crucial for lunar missions, occurred in February 1966. Throughout 1966, the Apollo-Saturn lunar program appeared to be on track. As NASA seemed poised to achieve the lunar landing goal, the question arose: What would come next?

NASA began addressing this question by establishing an Apollo Applications Office in 1966 to explore non-lunar applications of Apollo technology. The 1966 annual meeting of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics centered on “After Apollo, What Next?” However, even as the Apollo-Saturn program neared success, Congress and the American public began diverting attention and funding from space and NASA towards the escalating war in Vietnam. The war, and the allocation of resources, prompted a shift within NASA towards a “more practical” approach to space exploration. “More practical” translated to more efficient, less costly, and more economical space operations. Discussions about an orbiting space platform or station and a reusable Earth-to-orbit supply vehicle were revived.

Thus, in March 1966, a NASA planning team formulated a statement of work for a reusable ground launch vehicle, and in October, Marshall Space Flight Center and the Manned Spacecraft Center agreed to pursue independent research and development on such a spacecraft. However, NASA’s budgets were becoming increasingly constrained. At a January 1967 conference at NASA Headquarters, administrators reluctantly agreed to postpone new launch vehicle development to mitigate budget issues. The year 1967 saw little progress on reusable spacecraft development, while financial pressures intensified. In January 1968, George Mueller reignited interest in reusable spacecraft as a potential cost-saving measure, stating:

Where we stand now is the feasibility generally has been established for reusability. And we have much data on many concepts. We have an uncertain market demand and operational requirements. The R&D costs for fully reusable systems, including incremental development approaches, appear high. Personnel and cargo spacecraft seem to dominate Earth-to-orbit logistics costs. R&D costs for new logistics systems are in competition with dollars to develop payloads and markets (dollars are scarce).

Despite this, NASA deferred a decision on reusable vehicle development.

Meanwhile, NASA and the Air Force, which was independently studying orbiting laboratories and aerospace planes, collaborated and agreed on the necessity of a logistics space vehicle with a payload capacity of 5,000 to 50,000 pounds for use with a Space Station. Marshall and Manned Spacecraft Center administrators met again in October and decided to request a joint Phase A (concept definition) study for a logistics space vehicle from NASA Headquarters. Headquarters tentatively approved a study contract but withheld final approval pending the results of the Apollo 8 mission.

Apollo 8 was the first crewed Apollo flight powered by the Saturn rocket. Initially planned for Earth orbit, Marshall and Manned Spacecraft Centers successfully advocated for Apollo 8 to be a circumlunar mission. Despite being considered a “high risk” endeavor, Apollo 8, launched on December 28, 1968, sent astronauts Frank Borman, James A. Lovell, Jr., and William A. Anders into lunar orbit, completing ten orbits before safely returning to Earth. This mission significantly increased confidence in achieving a lunar landing within the decade and underscored the urgency of committing to a post-Apollo program. On January 23, 1969, George Mueller approved contract negotiations for design work on what would become the Space Shuttle. The Apollo 11 Moon landing in July 1969 further sharpened the focus on the Shuttle. The question, “After Apollo, What Next?” demanded an immediate answer.

President Richard M. Nixon established a Space Task Group to study the issue and propose options. Internal NASA studies complemented the Task Group’s work. On January 29, NASA awarded Phase A study contracts for elements of an “integral launch and reentry vehicle” (ILRV). Lockheed Missile & Space Company explored clustered reusable flyback stages. General Dynamics/Convair examined expendable fuel tanks and solid propulsion stages. These contracts were managed by Marshall. The Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston oversaw a North American Rockwell study on expendable tank configurations coupled with a reusable spacecraft. McDonnell Douglas, under Langley Research Center supervision, investigated tank, booster, and spacecraft (“triamese”) configurations. Martin Marietta also submitted an independent design study to NASA. Simultaneously, a joint DOD/NASA study on space transportation commenced, also reporting to the President’s Space Task Group.

In October 1969, Congressman Olin E. Teague, Chairman of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics’ subcommittee for NASA oversight, requested each NASA Center involved in crewed spaceflight to evaluate various “levels of effort” in relation to the Space Task Group’s recommendations. He sought assessments of the Task Group’s preliminary recommendations for NASA to prioritize a reusable spacecraft and a permanent space station. He also requested personal letters from key NASA officials, including Dale D. Myers, Robert R. Gilruth, Kurt H. Debus, Eberhard Rees, and Wernher von Braun, expressing their views on the importance of advancing the crewed spaceflight program.

Dale Myers emphasized the evolving focus of the space mission from the singular objective of Apollo to a broader effort to leverage space technology for human benefit. He stated, “In earth orbit, a space station supplied by the reusable shuttle will provide additional economic gains and practical benefits,” facilitating expanded space activities and increased human presence in space.

Robert R. Gilruth, Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center, strongly affirmed his belief that “the reusable Space Shuttle and the large Space Station are vital elements which must be developed,” describing the “earth-to-orbit shuttle” as “the keystone to our post-Apollo activities.” Kurt Debus highlighted the extensive technological advancements required for the Shuttle and Space Station, noting that the full utility of innovations is not always immediately apparent. He cited historical examples like the wheel, telephone, car, and airplane, advocating for immediate development of a fully reusable Space Shuttle and initiation of Phase B studies. Eberhard Rees argued that the solution to high space transportation costs was a system “which operates much like the cargo and passenger airlines, namely a Space Shuttle System.”

Wernher von Braun reviewed past accomplishments, emphasizing the space program’s contributions to national leadership, security, education, science, and technology, and America’s will to succeed. He stated:

… the key to our future accomplishments in space will be willingness to undertake the developments that will advance this nation to new plateaus of operational flexibility and will give us the technological advances needed to assure economical operations in space. No one would question the justification for a jet aircraft that can be flown over and over again instead of just once. With the Space Shuttle and the Space Station we will have the space age equivalent of the jet liner.

Robert F. Thompson, who became the Manned Spacecraft Center’s Space Shuttle Program Director in April 1970, explained that initial Phase A and DOD studies prioritized fully reusable systems, then perceived as the most cost-effective due to anticipated lower operating costs. However, by May 1969, the projected costs of fully reusable systems became daunting. By the end of the year, NASA Headquarters redirected Phase A studies towards a combination of expendable and recoverable boosters with reusable spacecraft. Phase A reports were received in November 1969, and the joint DOD/NASA studies concluded in December 1970. Both NASA’s internal studies and the DOD/NASA study continued to favor a fully reusable spacecraft.

In May 1970, NASA awarded Phase B contracts to a North American Rockwell and General Dynamics team and a McDonnell Douglas and Martin Marietta team for fully reusable shuttle definition studies. However, in June, contracts were also awarded to Grumman Aerospace and Boeing for studies on various expendable and reusable booster and fuel tank designs, to Lockheed for an expendable orbiter fuel tank study, and to Chrysler for a single-stage reusable orbiter design study. Additional contracts for component studies followed throughout 1970. The year concluded without a final Shuttle design decision, but with a range of promising options.

However, the escalating estimated costs of a fully reusable Shuttle became a critical factor, ultimately influencing not only the Shuttle’s design but also NASA’s future programs.

Developing a fully reusable Shuttle was conservatively estimated to “require more than a doubling of NASA’s budget,” deemed unrealistic, especially given increasing military spending in Southeast Asia. During congressional hearings on the FY 1971 NASA budget, NASA Comptroller Bill Lilly stated that if budget choices were necessary, the Shuttle should precede the Space Station because “if they could not be developed concurrently, the shuttle in extended sortie, could act as a surrogate Station and the long term future of space flight lay in reducing the cost of all operations, but foremost in the cost of delivery to low Earth orbit.” Funding remained precarious throughout the Shuttle’s development, and the decision on a fully or partially reusable Shuttle system remained unresolved.

Finally, on April 1, 1971, NASA shifted the Phase B contracts’ focus from “fully reusable” to considering an “orbiter” with external expendable hydrogen tanks. James C. Fletcher, who had succeeded Thomas O. Paine as NASA Administrator in April, believed that the $10.5 billion price tag for a fully reusable Shuttle was politically unviable. In June 1971, Max Faget of MSC’s Advanced Missions Program Office proposed an alternative configuration: a two-stage Shuttle with a drop tank orbiter. Administrator Fletcher adopted this configuration as NASA’s chosen path, and on June 16, 1971, informed Congress of the decision. Studies of the new configuration, featuring a fully reusable orbiter and expendable or reusable external booster rockets and tanks, subsequently reduced estimated R&D costs to around $5 billion – approximately half the cost of a fully reusable vehicle.

Four drawings show the shuttle design changing from 1972-1974. Steering engines enlarge, the conning tower gets lost, and sudden transitions along the body get smoothed out.

The partially reusable configuration offered the lowest development costs and also improved the orbiter’s aerodynamics and safety. An internal tank design would have required heavy spacecraft insulation, increased launch weights, and flight challenges related to tank torsion and fuel “slosh.” The extremely high pressure requirements in internal fuel tanks also posed greater risks and engineering and maintenance complexities. Refinement of the proposed configuration continued for another two years. At the time, this solution appeared to be the optimal balance of cost and technical feasibility.

Despite NASA’s June 1971 commitment to a reusable orbiter launched by a partially reusable propulsion system, specific congressional funding for Shuttle R&D was still lacking. Shuttle funding continued to come from general NASA spaceflight operations programs through FY 1973. Moreover, Shuttle program expenditures had risen from $12.5 million in 1970 to $78.5 million in 1971. Formal approval and dedicated funding were essential to continue the project.

In June 1971, Dale D. Myers, NASA’s Associate Administrator for Manned Space Flight, assigned Marshall Space Flight Center responsibility for developing the Shuttle’s main engine and boosters, and the Manned Spacecraft Center the orbiter development. Throughout 1971 and into 1972, NASA extended Phase B contracts and awarded new ones to investigate using existing Titan and Saturn rockets as Shuttle launch vehicles, the feasibility of liquid or solid propulsion boosters, and methods for recovering boosters and external tanks. In January 1972, Marshall Space Flight Center awarded contracts to Aerojet-General, Lockheed Propulsion Company, Thiokol Chemical, and United Technology Center to study using existing 120-inch and 156-inch solid rocket motors as Shuttle boosters. Preliminary and final reports confirmed the cost advantages of the new Shuttle configuration.

On January 5, 1972, Administrator Fletcher and Deputy Administrator George Low met with President Nixon and his staff assistant, John Erlichman, to review the Shuttle program. Nixon approved the revised, less costly Shuttle program and emphasized the civilian and international dimensions of Shuttle development and future missions.

However, Nixon’s support for the Shuttle faced headwinds due to the Vietnam War, the recently cancelled Air Force supersonic transport plane (SST), and political opposition. On January 7, Senator Edmund Muskie (D-ME), a Democratic presidential candidate, criticized the Space Shuttle as extravagant and called for its shelving, arguing that national priorities should be “hungry children, inadequate housing, decaying cities, and insecure old age.” He accused President Nixon of “pork barrel politics” in supporting the $5.5 billion space program.

Senator Walter Mondale (D-MN), another presidential aspirant, deemed the Space Shuttle program “ridiculous” in a televised debate, comparing it to “buying a fleet of goldplated Cadillacs to go out and repair the tire of a Pinto.” He questioned its value as “simply a truck—a very expensive truck that is not worth the money.”

Senator William Proxmire (D-WI), who had successfully opposed the SST, called Nixon’s decision to proceed with the Shuttle, estimated at “$15.5 billion,” “an outrageous distortion of budgetary priorities,” arguing that the President prioritized the Shuttle over essential programs like schools, healthcare, housing, and environmental needs. Despite this opposition, the space program had strong advocates in Congress, including Texas Congressman Olin E. Teague, Mississippi Senator John C. Stennis, and Missouri Senator Stuart Symington. Ultimately, the administrative decision to proceed with Shuttle development depended on Congressional approval and budget allocations. The Space Shuttle’s future appeared uncertain as Congress began budget debates in late January 1972.

In the interim, NASA increased its Shuttle spending from internal operations funds, from $78 million in 1971 to $100 million in 1972. In March 1972, Myers designated the Manned Spacecraft Center in Houston as the “lead center” for overall Space Shuttle Program Development management and control. Robert F. Thompson, a former member of the Space Task Group, continued as manager of the NASA-wide Shuttle Program Office.

Throughout 1971 and 1972, the Manned Spacecraft Center and Marshall Space Flight Center began integrating personnel from Apollo offices into the Shuttle program. Facing budget cuts and the conclusion of Apollo, many NASA administrators and engineers began leaving the agency. Wernher von Braun had relinquished his directorship of Marshall Space Flight Center in 1970, and Robert Gilruth stepped down as Director of the Manned Spacecraft Center in January 1972, replaced by Chris Kraft. Despite Apollo’s successes, NASA seemed to be undergoing internal upheaval while simultaneously redirecting resources to the Shuttle program. Aerospace contractors also experienced workforce reductions and organizational restructuring.

Despite NASA’s 14 years of spaceflight experience by 1972, the Shuttle represented a significant departure from previous spacecraft. As Aaron Cohen, manager of the Orbiter Project Office, explained, the “orbiter, although similar to Apollo in that it goes into space, is very different.” The Shuttle orbiter was not merely a spacecraft but a combination of launch vehicle, spacecraft, and airplane. The transition from Apollo to Shuttle represented a decade of technological advancement in materials, electronics, propulsion, and software. The Shuttle’s launch configuration also differed, with thrust applied through the orbiter and an offset external tank, posing structural dynamics challenges. Unlike Apollo, Gemini, and Mercury’s staged burns, the Shuttle utilized a parallel engine burn. Crucially, Shuttle engines were “throttlable,” offering controlled engine burn.

Cohen emphasized that certain Shuttle technologies were “outside the existing state of the art.” The controlled burn and extreme engine operating pressures and temperatures were significant engineering challenges. Testing required innovative equipment and procedures. The thermal protection system necessitated developing entirely new heat-resistant tiles. Each tile on the orbiter’s nose and underbody had to be individually designed and tested. A highly sophisticated avionics system, integrating electronics with aviation, fused four synchronized computers with a fifth standby computer. These computers, the Shuttle’s “heart and brains,” communicated 440 times per second, with a voting system to ensure accuracy and redundancy. Inputs from various sensors and ground stations fed into the avionics system. The Shuttle avionics system represented a revolutionary leap in electronics and computer technology since Apollo. Similarly, Apollo’s communications systems were inadequate for Shuttle missions.

The advanced nature of Shuttle avionics necessitated specialized development laboratories. NASA constructed a $630 million Shuttle Avionics Integration Laboratory (SAIL) at Johnson Space Center. A Shuttle Mission Simulator (SMS) was also developed for crew training, providing a “virtual reality” environment so realistic that astronauts felt they had already flown missions in simulation. Despite the technological advancements of the Shuttle over Apollo, Cohen believed that establishing a permanent Space Station would require further technological breakthroughs.

New technologies were expensive, and research and development costs (R&D) escalated. Inflation, peaking at nearly 13 percent in 1973, eroded the value of appropriated funds. NASA and other government agencies were particularly vulnerable because appropriations were fixed in nominal dollars from previous years. Congressional appropriations for NASA R&D decreased by almost $450 million (15 percent) in 1971 and further in 1972. While R&D appropriations slightly increased in 1973, they plummeted again in 1974. Throughout the critical Shuttle development years (1971-1977), R&D appropriations remained relatively stable in nominal terms, but their real value declined by about 50 percent due to inflation. Budgetary pressures led to “slippage” and delays, which, in turn, increased the final development costs.

Table I: NASA Appropriations, 1969-1978 (in thousands of dollars)

a – Shuttle funded under spaceflight operations program through FY 1973. b – For space station only. c – For shuttle and station; $6 million requested for station definition.

Source: NASA Pocket Statistics (January 1994), and Linda Neuman Ezell, ed., NASA Historical Data Book, 3:69 (for shuttle funding, 1969-1977).

NASA’s overall budget, adjusted to 1992 dollars, significantly declined from its FY 1965 peak of over $22 billion to an average of $9 billion between 1974 and 1979 (using 1994 constant dollars).

Although dedicated congressional funding for the Shuttle began in 1974, NASA transitioned from planning and study to design and production in 1972-1973. A major achievement of Shuttle development was the complex business and production management required to integrate disparate systems into a unified machine. All NASA centers and hundreds of private manufacturers were involved. NASA acted as the management team, orchestrating the production of a single machine by diverse private entities. Private industry, not NASA, built the Shuttle, continuing the peacetime mobilization of American science, engineering, and industry initiated at NASA’s inception. The management structure, inherited from Apollo, was refined. In 1971, NASA Headquarters assigned Marshall Space Flight Center booster and main engine development, Stennis Space Center engine testing, and Manned Spacecraft Center orbiter development. Kennedy Space Center handled launch and recovery. The Shuttle Program Office at MSC in Houston coordinated technical work, reporting to the Office of Manned Space Flight at NASA Headquarters.

The management structure resembled Apollo’s but with more decentralized production and centralized integration. Integration Panels, similar to those in Apollo, coordinated design and construction to ensure component compatibility. These panels reported to the Systems Integration Office in the Shuttle Program Office, which, in turn, reported to a Policy Review Control Board at NASA Headquarters.

Shuttle management became a state-of-the-art system for large-scale industrial production, surpassing precedents like the Panama Canal, battleships, hypersonic aircraft, and Apollo in complexity.

Technical engineering and management decisions flowed bottom-up within the three-level management structure. Level III project offices, like the Orbiter Office at MSC and the Booster Office at Marshall, managed production contracts and maintained resident offices at contractor sites. Level II, the Shuttle Program Office, oversaw systems engineering, integration, configuration, and overall design and development. Level I, NASA Headquarters, held overall program responsibility, assigned duties, set performance requirements, allocated funds, and controlled major milestones.

This structure fostered a decentralized, independent production system, well-suited to the diverse private entities comprising NASA’s industrial base. A key achievement of the space program was harnessing American industry’s strengths through decentralized management, contrary to typical large bureaucratic tendencies.

Private industry formed the real “Level IV” production base. NASA contracts and competitive bidding mobilized American industry for the space program.

Preliminary study, design, and feasibility contracts (Phases A & B) led to Requests for Proposals (RFPs). NASA issued RFPs for Shuttle procurement in spring 1971. Aerojet Liquid Rocket Company, Pratt & Whitney, and Rocketdyne were invited to bid for Shuttle main engine development. MSC issued an RFP for a thermal protection system. In July 1971, MSFC selected Rocketdyne for main engine production, although Pratt & Whitney challenged the award, leading to a GAO review and an interim contract for Rocketdyne. In March 1972, MSC issued an RFP for payload systems, and NASA for Shuttle development, with designs due in May.

North American Rockwell, McDonnell Douglas, Grumman, and Lockheed submitted Shuttle proposals. NASA awarded an interim contract to Rockwell in August 1972, finalized on April 16, 1973. Rockwell subcontracted major orbiter components: Fairchild Republic (vertical tail), Grumman (delta wings), General Dynamics (mid-fuselage), and McDonnell Douglas (orbital maneuvering system). Contractors and subcontractors further engaged a vast network of suppliers across American industry, contributing electronics, ceramics, metals, plastics, and chemicals. The Shuttle was a composite creation of American industry, technology, and labor.

The Shuttle evolved throughout its development. New challenges, concerns, and technologies constantly altered its design and engineering. Each change often impacted other systems, making the Shuttle a prime example of “systems engineering.” For instance, the decision for a “returnable” external fuel tank was reconsidered. Similarly, the orbiter’s thermal protection for reentry was a later design consideration. The payload bay design also changed with evolving payload requirements, affecting flight characteristics and plans. Building an unprecedented aerospace craft without unmanned test flights pushed engineering and design to the cutting edge.

Robert F. Thompson, Space Shuttle Program Manager from 1970 to 1981, considered “the decision to abandon the ‘fully reusable’ ground rule and employ expendable tankage for the orbiter main rocket engines propellant” as the most critical configuration decision. Initially, NASA intended to launch the Shuttle with reusable solid rocket boosters and a reusable external propellant tank, which would be deorbited and recovered. However, in June 1972, Howard W. Tindall flagged a major problem: returning the fuel tank from orbit. It appeared to require a complex and costly attitude control system.

This issue was addressed by a team from the Advanced Mission Design Branch. In August, they proposed “staging” (dropping) the fuel tank before reaching orbit, solving the reentry problem. This was initially rejected as it required additional internal fuel tanks for the orbiter to achieve orbit, increasing weight and complexity. However, further study revealed that the existing orbital maneuvering system could propel the orbiter to orbital velocity after external tank separation.

Thompson initially opposed this due to increased fuel needs for the orbital maneuvering system. However, by December, new studies showed that orbital maneuvers required less fuel than initially estimated, freeing up fuel for the orbital maneuvering system. The Advanced Mission Design Branch proposed suborbital staging of the external tank, with recovery in the Indian Ocean. This not only solved the tank reentry issue but also increased payload capacity by 5,000 pounds. NASA opted to maintain the original 32,000-pound payload requirement and reduce solid rocket booster thrust, resulting in an estimated program saving of $238 million. Cost remained a driving factor in Shuttle design.

Design and development options emerged at every stage. NASA chose a more advanced, higher-performance main liquid rocket engine over a less costly, lower-pressure engine. Despite higher development costs, the higher-pressure engine enabled a larger orbiter, maximized launch acceleration, improved abort capabilities, and offered better overall performance. The expendable tank design allowed using high-performance orbiter engines throughout launch and provided a safety margin by verifying orbiter engine start before booster ignition. Another key decision was to forgo a crewless test flight, as the Shuttle’s guidance and control systems were designed for human operation, making a truly representative unmanned test impossible. Thus, the first Shuttle flight would be piloted.

A persistent challenge was insulating the orbiter for atmospheric reentry, which generated temperatures of 3,000°F (1,650°C). Two approaches were considered: insulating conventional aircraft materials or building a “hot structure” from heat-resistant metals. NASA chose to insulate conventional aircraft metals with thermal protective coatings due to the unknowns of “hot structures.”

However, existing thermal protection materials were inadequate. A NASA task group developed a silicone-type tile (high-purity foamed silica coated with borosilicate glass). Initially fragile, the tiles were thickened and redesigned with a ludox base, which proved effective. Attaching the 31,000 individually cast tiles required developing new adhesives and 670,000 labor-hours. While tile development was “leading edge,” it exemplified the broad range of innovation required for the Shuttle, from space-compatible toilets to advanced avionics and computer systems. Shuttle technology spurred advancements in various fields, including aviation, medicine, computers, plastics, and metallurgy, with impacts extending far beyond spaceflight.

The Space Shuttle’s significance lay in its payload – the cargo, experiments, and laboratories it transported to and from space. Payload operations became a complex challenge, both technically and organizationally. Each flight required unique preparations due to varying payloads.

A NASA Shuttle Payload Activities Team emphasized the need for a “radical change in thinking” to transition to the Shuttle’s operational “ferris wheel” mode. They stressed separating the transportation system from payloads, clearly defining payload and operator responsibilities, and streamlining payload approval processes. The team cautioned against competition among NASA centers for payload control and questioned NASA’s ability to become a service-oriented organization rather than a purely R&D agency. Building and launching the first Shuttle involved fundamental social and philosophical adjustments alongside technological innovation.

Despite challenges and budget constraints, NASA initially aimed for a first Shuttle flight in 1978. However, budget pressures and technical issues caused delays. In 1972, Dale Myers worried that Skylab cost overruns could delay or even cancel the Shuttle program, noting that “The Shuttle Program will live or die based on our capability to keep it reasonably on schedule.” Delays and technical problems with tiles, tanks, and rocket motors increased costs.

Rockwell engineers cited funding shortages causing out-of-sequence work and deferred quality testing on the thermal protection system, leading to later problem identification and increased costs. The number of engineering drawings for the thermal protection system increased by 35% due to delays and changes, prompting Rockwell to request a “Program Adjustment” for additional funding.

Wayne Young of the Shuttle Program Office explained that the Shuttle was developed in “an austere budget environment,” forcing cost-driven decisions that sometimes compromised engineering ideals. As costs rose, scheduling and integration became even more critical.

In 1977, the Enterprise (Orbiter 101) fuselage was completed, and Columbia neared completion. Congress authorized five Shuttles (including Challenger, Discovery, and Atlantis), initially estimated at $550-$600 million each, but ultimately exceeding $1 billion. NASA conducted five unpowered glide tests in 1977. Rocketdyne began Shuttle main engine testing, which faced setbacks, including a test stand fire. Over 650 test firings were conducted between 1977 and 1980 before the first flight in 1981. Problems often stemmed from using conventional valves and fittings in the high-thrust hydrogen-oxygen engine.

Photo of STS-1 lifting-off from Pad 39A

By April 12, 1981, when Columbia ignited its engines at Kennedy Space Center, the Space Shuttle program had already endured a long and challenging journey. Reaching the launchpad was itself a triumph. The three main Shuttle engines ignited, followed by the solid rocket boosters. Columbia lifted off. The solid rocket boosters separated and parachuted into the Atlantic. The main engines continued firing, drawing fuel from the external tank. Main engine cutoff occurred, and the external tank detached and disintegrated upon reentry. Columbia then fired its orbital maneuvering system engines, first to enter orbit, then to stabilize its orbit. Launch to orbit took just twelve minutes.

Drawing of Shuttle Mission Profile shows lift-off, solid-booster and liquid-tank seperation, orbit, mission, re-entry, and splashdown.

The STS-1 mission crew comprised Commander John W. Young, a veteran astronaut with prior Gemini and Apollo missions, and Pilot Robert L. Crippen, a former Air Force Manned Orbiting Laboratory Program astronaut. Crippen described the launch as “one fantastic ride!”

Columbia adjusted its orbit and flew in a tail-forward, upside-down orientation for much of the flight, providing the crew with an enhanced Earth view. Young and Crippen checked systems, computers, thrusters, and cargo bay doors. The return journey began on April 14. Orbital maneuvering rockets fired for two minutes and twenty-seven seconds to initiate descent. Gravity took over. After an hour-long descent, attitude control thrusters reoriented Columbia for reentry, nose-forward to protect the thermal tiles. Over Rogers Dry Lake in the Mojave Desert, Columbia executed a sharp bank and landing pattern, touching down at 215 mph.

Photo from chase plane of Columbia landing on Rogers Drylake Runway 23.

The touchdown marked the successful conclusion of STS-1, after 2 days, 6 hours, 20 minutes, and 52 seconds. President Ronald Reagan greeted the returning crew, declaring, “Today our friends and adversaries are reminded that we are a free people capable of great deeds. We are a free people in search of progress for mankind.” This pursuit of progress, embodied by the reusable Space Shuttle, reflected the collective energies, innovation, technologies, aspirations, and investments of the American people, extending far beyond NASA, its contractors, and the astronauts honored with the 1981 Collier Trophy.